The Independent Uganda: You get the Truth we Pay the Price
The transformation of democracy from a political form into a faith-based self-destructive secular religion
THE LAST WORD | Andrew M. Mwenda | If one scans the political-intellectual map of the world today, one idea stands dominant: that the solution to the governance problems of any country is democracy. Even in those areas without a stable state, such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya, Central African Republic, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan etc. democracy is presented as the first and only solution. Indeed, even people who are hurt the most by democracy believe it—as an article of faith. To critique democracy as a solution to governance challenges is sacrilege. And yet this is the purpose of this article.
But first, a historic perspective. Democracy emerged (or at least was first intellectually articulated) in ancient Athens around 506BC after the legislation of Solon. It was based on a city-state with a population of 320,000, of whom only about 30,000 were enfranchised citizens. The rest were women, children, and slaves excluded from it. It was based on public gatherings of all eligible citizens in one public square. However, it was a limited democracy. Yet it led to governance chaos by the Athenian assembly, including mismanagement of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. It led to the defeat of Athens. Greek philosophers of the time (Socrates and his student Plato) and later Aristotle became hostile to it.
Subsequent semi-democracies emerged in the small city-states of Carthage, Rome, Florence, Venice etc. As Rome expanded in size and strength, that limited democracy degenerated into civil war for a century, leading to the fall of the republic and the inauguration of the Roman Empire. Every historian of any heft would say it was the Socratic wheel at work: tyranny gives way to democracy; then democracy allows liberty that turns into license pushing society towards anarchy. This makes people desire order and demand a strong leader i.e. a tyrant. We are seeing this trend in Western countries, most evidently in the USA with the rise of Donald Trump.
There have been two competing definitions of democracy. The first was articulated by Abraham Lincoln as a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. This focused on the source of power (the will of the people expressed through their votes) and the purposes to which power is put (serving the people). This definition held sway until 1940 when Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter published his seminal work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. He argued that the basis of democracy is the procedures of gaining and retaining power. If there is freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly, followed by free and fair elections, then a government born out of that process would be democratic.
This unleashed the dogs of intellectual war. Debate raged for decades, but by the 1970s, a consensus had emerged in support of Schumpeter’s argument. Democratically elected leaders may win elections whipping up ethnic, religious, and/or racial sentiments (the far right in Israel and the USA, for example). In government they may be corrupt, venal, and incompetent. However, such a government though undesirable, would nonetheless be democratic. Therefore, democracy is not an automatic guarantee for good government. But as democracy has transformed from a political idea into a religious faith, these insights have been lost among its supporters.
The current obsession with democracy as a solution to the governance challenges of every country lacks both historical context and fails to understand or respect cultural diversity. In this article, I will focus on historic context.
Democracy has been elevated from a political form specific to a particular time and place to a universal form applicable everywhere and anytime regardless of circumstances. Yet no political system is eternal or capable of universal application. All political systems are products of their time and circumstances. Liberal democracy is no exception. Indeed, even in the West, the future of liberal democracy is not guaranteed.
Yet many people in the West and elsewhere believe liberal democracy in the West will last forever. This conviction is also based more on faith than either historic reflection or current realities. Liberal democracy in the West has worked, thrived, and survived under very specific conditions. These include ethnic homogeneity, access to centralized mass media, urbanization, universal education and, most critically, sustained economic growth leading to consistently growing incomes and living standards for most people.
Today, we are witnessing increasing ethnic, racial, cultural and religious diversity in Western societies due to immigration. Alongside this development we see slow, stagnant, or declining economic growth leading to stagnant or declining incomes for most people. This has led to a catastrophic decline in living standards for most people. Yet at the same time there are rapidly growing incomes for the top ten percent of the populations of the West, leading to massive income inequalities. Populist demagogues exploit immigration, claiming ethnic, religious, and racial immigrant communities are the cause of economic decline for the natives.
Thus, many Western liberal democracies are under intense internal pressure. Right-wing political parties, hostile to liberal democracy, are gaining ground every day. In Italy, Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, and Poland they have won or are poised to win elections. In the USA, they have won elections and are now reversing many liberal democratic structures. We are therefore not sure whether liberal democracy in the West will survive the current trends.
Liberal democracy in the West has been dominant only after the end of the Second World War. In the interwar years (1919-39), a semblance of democracy was sustained in only the USA, UK, Switzerland, Finland, the Irish Free State, and France. These countries contained a small part of the world population, including Europe. And none of them would have been called a democracy under today’s standards. The economic collapse of 1929 undermined democracy, leading to the rise and success of fascism in Europe.
Democracy consolidated in the West after WW2 because of sustained economic boom under USA leadership till the mid 1970s. Then the West entered a period of income stagnation for most people and growing inequality, leading to the 2008 economic crisis. This was a major turning point whose consequences may be realized after a time lag. Brexit, Trump and the success of right-wing parties in Europe show long-term trends. Declining living standards and the immigration crisis are already leading to a decline in public faith in democracy in the West. These trends are not in spite of democracy but precisely because of it. Democracy does not cushion itself against collapse. Like Socrates predicted 2,400 years ago, its own excesses lead inexorably towards its demise.
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amwenda@ugindependent.co.ug
Mr. Mwenda critiques the uncritical global promotion of democracy, especially in fragile and diverse states, and highlights its limitations in the West. However, claiming democracy has failed or lost relevance in Africa overlooks a key point: the problem lies not in democracy’s ideals but in its shallow implementation and external imposition without local context.
Democracy has lost relevance in Africa because it is treated as a universal solution, ignoring historical and social realities. It arose under conditions largely absent in Africa. The continent’s political challenges demand governance models that respect cultural diversity and socio-economic realities, rather than applying a Western democratic template that itself faces decline.
Many African states inherited artificial borders, weak institutions, and extractive economies. Without strong institutions and civic culture, elections alone make democracy vulnerable to manipulation – reflecting a lack of democratic deepening, not irrelevance.
Citizens across Africa still risk their lives demanding accountability and leadership choice, showing democracy’s enduring appeal. Countries like Botswana, Ghana, and Senegal prove that democratic governance can bring stability and progress.
The issue is the reduction of democracy to mere elections without addressing socio-economic foundations. Africa and the world should recommit to inclusive, just, and institutionally grounded democracy – not less, but better democracy.
Democracy, as envisaged in an ideal situation, isn’t possible under a corrupt, inefficient, unequal and divisive global system. One country’s “democracy” must differ from that of another due to their unique circumstances. Of all leaders in the world, none satisfies “democrat stature” much as they all have supporters and backers. There will always be something missing on the scale. But seeing what’s happening where all pretences are being discarded, we are headed for a loose global system where authoritarianism is the new norm. You keep hearing people making reference to “benevolent dictatorship” where the efficiency of systems and delivery on articulated targets is all that matters. Democracy may have run its course and now losing footing in a where no single electoral cycle is free of malpractices and accusations of unfairness, and levels of human rights observance and freedoms are not equally appreciated or satisfactory. Democracy would have stayed relevant “for eternity” if people were honest and could establish the truth that works for everyone. As things stand, authoritarianism is taking root and we had better prepare for an “all-seeing global state”.
Democracy Is Flawed—But Far from Doomed
Andrew, your critique of democracy paints a picture of an ancient political cycle—tyranny to democracy to anarchy and back again—playing out inevitably in our time. It is a compelling narrative, but it oversimplifies history, blurs important distinctions, and risks mistaking current turbulence for terminal decline.
First, the “Socratic wheel” is not destiny. Many democracies have endured for decades through war, economic crisis, and social upheaval—India, Japan, and the Scandinavian countries among them—precisely because they adapt and reform. Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies possess built-in mechanisms for course correction: elections, judicial review, and citizen mobilization.
Second, the critique is overwhelmingly Western in scope. It overlooks democracies like Botswana, Uruguay, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have thrived under very different historical and cultural conditions. These cases challenge the notion that democracy is a fragile transplant doomed to fail outside its birthplace.
Third, the argument blames democracy itself for rising inequality, populism, and polarization. In reality, these crises are driven by deeper structural forces—globalization, automation, and decades of neoliberal economic policy—that have hit democracies and autocracies alike.
Finally, the piece conflates democracy in its broadest sense (elections and popular sovereignty) with liberal democracy (constitutionalism, rights protections, and checks on power). The problems it identifies often stem from the erosion of liberal safeguards, not from democracy as a whole.
Democracy is imperfect and under strain. But it is also flexible, self-renewing, and capable of evolving with the times. To declare it fatally flawed risks ignoring both its resilience and the alternatives—which history shows can be far worse.