Inside the DRC and Ukraine

How international involvement in the affairs of these two countries has complicated internal conflict resolution

THE LAST WORD | Andrew M. Mwenda | The DRC and Ukraine may be geographically and culturally apart but they share many similarities. DRC is the second largest country in Africa, after Algeria. Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, after Russia. Western DRC has been at war with its citizens in its eastern region, who are culturally connected to people in Rwanda and Uganda. Ukraine has been at war with people in its eastern region who are culturally related to Russia. Western DRC refuses to recognize these people, especially of Kinyarwanda culture, as being citizens of the country. Western Ukraine (Galicia) does the same to people in Eastern Ukraine.

Eastern DRC is also economically and in terms of infrastructure more integrated with Uganda and Rwanda than with Western DRC. The same applies to Eastern Ukraine, whose economy and infrastructure are more integrated with Russia than Western Ukraine. In both countries, these realities have led the Western parts of the two countries to see people in the Eastern parts as either foreigners (and therefore they should either be assimilated i.e. their culture be erased) or chased away to go back to “their country,” in DRC’s case, Rwanda, and in Ukraine’s case, Russia. Over the last three decades, this has led to internal conflicts in both countries, which have in turn attracted the attention of concerned neighbors. In the case of DRC, it is Rwanda and Uganda. In the case of Ukraine, it is Russia.

In both cases, global powers have expressed interest in the affairs of these two countries. They seek to exploit these internal contradictions to pursue their own agendas. For instance, the USA sees in Ukraine an opportunity to weaken a rival, Russia. Its vassal states in the rest of Europe follow their master’s bidding. In the case of DRC, these global powers, with the Americans leading the Europeans, see an opportunity for grabbing that nation’s mineral resources. They project this greed onto Uganda and Rwanda and imagine that these two countries are similarly motivated.

Thus, the interests of global powers turn what is largely a local conflict with regional dimensions into a global conflict. In the case of Ukraine, they define the problem as Russian aggression, thereby denying the local grievances that are driving the country into self-destruction. In the case of DRC, they define the problem as Rwandan aggression and/or Ugandan meddling and thereby ignore local grievances of people in the east. In both countries, this internationalization of the conflicts has complicated conflict resolution.

Secondly, the structure of incentives created by the US and her allies meddling in the affairs of Ukraine makes the situation worse. Confident that the big powers are behind them, Ukrainians in the west of the country (Galicia) find little incentive to seek internal political accommodation with Ukrainians in the east (Marollos). Instead, they are incentivized to demonize Moscow and accuse it of being the source of all the country’s problems.

For instance, Western Ukrainians believe that for their country to be truly free and independent, it must forsake everything Russian. This is especially appealing given the history of that country under Russian rule. They argue that for the Ukrainian state to consolidate, the country must be purged of Russian influence. So, they demand the abolition of the Russian language in official communications, schools, etc., and that Russian culture (music, dress, drama, movies, etc.) must be abandoned. They also demand separation from the Russian Orthodox Church. For these people, Ukrainian nationalism is seen as monolithic and anti-Russian.

But the people of Eastern Ukraine who speak Russian feel that Ukrainian nationalism and close ties with Russia are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. So, they insist on using their language (Russian) at home, in official communications, in school, etc.; on being part of the Russian Orthodox Church, on having close economic and cultural ties with Moscow; etc. They see Ukrainian nationalism as a threat to their identity. For them, Ukrainian nationalism defined monolithically is destructive. They prefer “civic patriotism” to “nationalism” because it recognizes the cultural diversity of the country. For this, the nationalists in Western Ukraine see Eastern Ukrainians as fifth columnists of the Russian monster.

Hence, we have a convergence of different but compatible interests between Russia and Russophile Ukrainians. The extreme nationalism of Western Ukrainians threatens Eastern Ukrainian identity, which is culturally Russian. This induces them to seek protection from Moscow. The interests of the USA to wrestle Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit and put it into NATO make Russia feel encircled. It therefore exploits the genuine and legitimate fears, grievances, and anxieties of Eastern Ukrainians to intervene in that country to counter American and her allies’ influence.

This is the exact situation we find in DRC. People in Western DRC led by their politicians, deny that the problem of their country is domestic. Instead, they argue that it is Rwanda (and sometimes Uganda) that is/are the problem. Meanwhile, Congolese politicians call for the mass killing of people of Kinyarwanda culture in the east, confiscate their property (land and cows), and rape their daughters and wives. They also claim that these people are not citizens of Congo and should therefore return to Rwanda. These actions and the presence of the genocidal FDLR draw Rwanda into this conflict.

Of course, threatened with extermination and/or eviction, the people of Kinyarwanda culture in eastern DRC seek alliance with and protection from Kigali. Here we see—again—a convergence of different but also compatible interests. Kigali needs local support and allies in the DRC to contain the FDLR. The people of Kinyarwanda culture need protection from their own government, and they see Rwanda as an important ally. The international community, seeing Rwanda’s involvement, dismisses local grievances and argues that this is merely external aggression and a violation of DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It demands Kigali withdraw from DRC as the first and only solution to the crisis in that country.

What then would be the solution in both countries? In just one word: federalism. Kiev and Kinshasa need to recognize the rights of their citizens in the eastern regions. They need to respect their culture and way of life. And they need to allow them to integrate with those countries closest to them in culture, economy, and infrastructure. This means granting significant autonomy to these regions to manage local and regional affairs. Attempts to erase their identity, in a misguided effort to enforce a nationalism defined monolithically as uniformity, will not work. Neither is a military solution in both countries desirable and/or sustainable.

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amwenda@ugindependent.co.ug