Dissecting Sudan’s Coup

What are the regional and international dynamics of the coup and what options do the United States and the international community have to support a potential return to a transitional government?

Tucker: The coup comes at a time of unprecedented conflict and political crisis in the greater Horn of Africa. Without civilian diplomacy, the military might take on more contentious stances on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the regional feud over Nile water access. The coup also cripples Sudan’s already limited ability to effectively chair the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the regional bloc tasked with confronting regional crises.

The interests of Egypt and Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have undoubtedly impacted the trajectory of the transition, and it is possible Sudan’s military thought that they would turn a blind eye to a takeover. Any financial and diplomatic support from these countries could have played into the military’s calculations and, in the wake of actions such as the U.S. government’s decision to suspend $700 million of assistance and the World Bank doing the same after the coup, may be critical to the country’s strained economy. Further punitive measures are likely being considered by international actors depending on how the situation evolves.

We hear from Sudanese that they have access to little information about how the interests of regional countries may have impacted the situation to date. More transparency is needed about how the region and international community engages with Sudan. So far, many statements by international actors have condemned the coup with boilerplate language and called for a return to the transition, but it is their use of leverage and actions behind the scenes that carry weight. The African Union (AU) is poised to play a significant role in both public and private efforts, and this should be supported by the United States. The AU has already suspended Sudan’s membership following the coup.

The crisis in Sudan presents a sliver of opportunity for the United States and others to reiterate the primacy of the Constitutional Declaration, and perhaps the JPA, as the foundation of the transition. In the case of the latter, it should create space to review the process and outcomes that many viewed as inadequate, divisive and reducing complex problems to elite power-sharing and committee formation. However, in the near term, there will likely be a need for international actors to support, as they did in some ways during al-Bashir’s dictatorship, the capacity of civil society activists, independent media and citizen leaders. Coordinated U.S. and international efforts to convince the military to release detainees are an important part of this process. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was returned to his home on October 26 but is under surveillance.

Protesters have taken to the streets in opposition to the coup and there are reports circulating that the military has begun cracking down on demonstrations. Given the military’s current position and apparent reticence to cede control to civilian leaders, where does the pro-democracy movement in Sudan go from here?

Taha: Many Sudanese citizens and political stakeholders, as well as the international community, are reeling from the military takeover. Key leaders have been detained and it is likely that other civil society activists have been as well. Countless others are probably in hiding. Telecommunications and internet blackouts make it hard to gather information.

However, nonviolent protests in the capital and other cities of Sudan make it clear that those citizens, especially youth, women and members of professional associations, are mobilised to protect their revolution. These stakeholders, as well as civilian political leaders viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the public, should indicate how there can be a return to a more democratic pathway. This may take time, and the anger among citizens is likely to continue. We hear from many inside Sudan that dialogue with the military is premature and would be rejected by most, and that considerable pressure needs to be placed on the military to reverse course. Calls to simply go back to the previous iteration of the transitional government are likely to be met with skepticism from many on the ground.

Burhan noted in his press conference that new transitional institutions will be formed in 10 days and claimed that the new government will not include politicians, presumably being composed of people identified as technocrats. This will be a key moment because it could widen the current divisions among civilian and political actors, pitting those who join against those deposed. Some ministers in the dissolved cabinet have been condemning the coup — for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariam al-Sadig al-Mahdi — and their responses to a new cabinet will be telling. Importantly, on October 27, the European Union (EU) delegation in Sudan, along with the embassies of some EU and non-EU member states and the United States in Khartoum, issued a key statement noting they “continue to recognise the Prime Minister and his cabinet as the constitutional leaders of the transitional government.”

Talk of planned elections at the end of the transition is also likely to be controversial because the takeover disrupts the transition’s key benchmarks to be met to ensure that institutions, laws and political and civil liberties are in place for an inclusive and fair election. It is easy to say that the Sudanese public does not want a return to dictatorship or military rule. But it is harder to say where the transition goes from this point. Whatever the direction the country takes, it will continue to face decisions about the fundamental nature of the state and how its citizens, including those in the military, relate to its government, economy and society.

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