Kizza Besigye’s biggest mistake

This means that even if Besigye had won the presidency in 2016, the NRM using its 82% control of parliament and 88% control of districts could easily have made it impossible for him to govern. They could even have impeached him on the flimsiest excuse. In such a case, Besigye could easily have found himself in a position where he has to act dictatorially i.e. use the military to stop parliament from impeaching him.

The tragedy of FDC – and the wider opposition in Uganda – is that while they have not captured the coveted presidency, they have also made no gains in parliament and districts. This is especially true for FDC. Its numbers have either been stagnant or declining (see Tables 1 and 2). Yet in every election, over 60% of incumbent MPs and district chairpersons are not reelected. This means that every election opens more opportunities for FDC and the wider opposition to make gains in parliament and districts. They have not gained in large part because they have not taken winning parliament as seriously as they take winning the presidency.

Secondly, Besigye’s personal courage combined with his militant and belligerent approach to politics has made him a hero of folklore among the most radical opponents of Museveni. These are the men and women willing to stake everything to defend their position in the face of a police force always used to buttress Museveni’s position. As the radicals have gained their strength in the FDC, many moderate leaders and even voters have been distancing themselves from the party, thus solidifying its base without growing its appeal.

Thirdly, the dominance of radicals in the FDC and the marginalisation of moderate voices have weakened the voice of the opposition in parliament. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the opposition had few MPs but a big voice in parliament because it boasted politicians of excellent calibre like Ben Wacha, Okullo Epak etc. Today the opposition may have more MPs yet less voice because those who win are radicals of poor intellectual calibre.

To win in opposition strongholds today requires one to take such an extremist stance that most reasonable potential opposition candidates keep away. It also means that FDC increasingly has radical MPs; the few reasonable ones prefer silence. To speak their mind is to attract hostile and savage accusations that they are either weak or compromised.

The fourth result is that the radicalisation of FDC has also undermined any possible compromise with Museveni. Besigye himself may not be hostile to negotiations and some meaningful compromise. Rather because he has built his brand around foolhardy militancy and belligerence and is now afraid that any attempt at compromise will be seen as capitulation by his radical base. Besigye’s great friend, the embattled Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago finds himself in exactly this position. Therefore, these leaders reluctance to compromise is not based on conviction but convenience. In short Besigye is hostage to his radical base.