Revolution or reform

Lebanon’s only way out must tackle sectarianism and corruption

| NABEEL KHOURY | According to the old Phoenician legend, Lebanon dies but repeatedly rises from the ashes. After historic fires, foreign invasions, and civil wars, this adage seems to ring true, especially for the Lebanese who have always thought of themselves as survivors. However, when you add the deep-seated corruption and criminal negligence—evidenced by the deadly and destructive explosion on August 4—to all the calamities, it is hard to see Lebanon rising again.

With hyper-inflation knocking at the door, electricity to residences rationed like never before, and the coronavirus already testing national hospital capacities, Lebanon’s economic crisis is unprecedented in its eighty years of existence as a modern state. One would have to go back prior to its 1943 independence—to World War I and the final days of the Ottoman Empire—to find a similar record of starvation and deprivation. A small country with a population of over 6 million, Lebanon hosts close to a million and a half Syrian refugees as well as approximately 300,000 Palestinians still classified as refugees by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Basic services, such as water, electricity, and sanitation have dwindled at an alarming rate, not to mention public education and public health. On top of all of these challenges, a financial crisis, precipitated by burgeoning international and domestic debt, has siphoned off the country’s hard currency. This has placed nearly two-thirds of the population in a situation where they have limited access to their bank accounts—many Lebanese, be it dual national or not, have US dollar accounts—and therefore must pay for food and other necessities with the much depreciated Lebanese Lira.

It has become clear, at least since the uprising that started in October 2019, that what the Lebanese are protesting is not a simple case of financial mismanagement, but a fundamentally flawed system that superimposes sectarianism, feudalism, and corruption on every decision made at every level of government. This system, dating back to the National Pact of 1943, has historically led to stalled government-formation, failed governments, and violent clashes—the most protracted of which was the fifteen-year civil war from 1975 to 1990.

The Pact was a grand compromise between Lebanese who wanted to be part of the greater Arab world and those who wanted to remain isolated from regional disputes, preferably under the wing of France, which ruled the country under a mandate until its independence. This demanded consensus on major decisions—whether domestic or foreign policy issues—in order to maintain a no-victor-no-vanquished formula and preserve Lebanese unity. The problems inherent in this system grew over the years instead of being gradually phased out. Practically every position in government had to be apportioned according to sect, which meant patronage to parties both religious and secular over job allocation, government-awarded contracts, and the importation of all goods and services. The corrupt allocation of this bounty worked—albeit at the expense of comprehensive economic development and the efficient provision of basic services to all citizens—as long as consensus prevailed over the division of the spoils of governance

Rampant corruption

The rebuilding of Beirut in 1990, largely the initiative of the late prime minister Rafik Hariri, had a stellar impact on the revival of downtown Beirut, which was devastated by fifteen years of bloody civil war. However, the rebuilding was and has remained controversial in Lebanon and many even blame the current crisis, at least in its fiscal dimensions, on the means used to revive downtown Beirut. The reconstruction projects, mostly undertaken via Solidaire (though it was open to small investors), was largely owned by the Hariris and wealthy investors from the Gulf. The Lebanese state obtained large domestic and international loans, causing public debt to balloon to $40 billion by the end of the decade—a figure that doubled by 2015. The reconstructed downtown Beirut became a protest battle zone when the garbage crisis erupted in 2015 (trash was not picked up for months because there was no consensus on who would assign the contract to which company).

Furthermore, the reconstruction did not extend far beyond Beirut city limits, drawing criticism that regional favoritism was being practiced. The controversy also set off fierce competition by various Lebanese factions for contracts and percentages of investments in foreign companies that were invited for other modernization projects. Solidaire essentially opened up new avenues for corruption to a country already burdened by it. Transparency International ranked Lebanon 137th out of 180 countries on a corruption matrix for 2019. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union are currently considering helping Lebanon out of its fiscal crisis and have stipulated serious reforms, especially with the aim of ending corruption.

There are two logical pathways out of the current chaos in Lebanon: revolution or reform. The first option requires strong leadership, organization and, even if a non-violent strategy is adopted, preparing for the risk of protracted violence. The second option requires an agreement by Lebanon’s powerful elite to start a new chapter, gradually developing the ability to conduct business without corruption. This could possibly occur on the basis of forgiving past transgressions—something that would require consensus around a truth and reconciliation approach to transitional justice.